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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  On October 1, 2003, the Federal Trade Commission’s National Do-
Not-Call Registry was supposed to go into effect.1  By forbidding 
companies and telemarketers from making unsolicited calls to anyone who 
had registered their phone number on the list three months prior,2 this 
 
 
 * J.D. (expected), Harvard Law School, 2005; B.A., Duke University, 2000.  Special thanks to 
Laurence Tribe, Kimberly Krawiec, Rodney Smolla, and Alexis Strauss for their helpful comments 
and support. 
 1 Daniel A. Cotter, Don’t Call Me, I’ll Call You: The FCC and FTC’s Do-Not-Call Registry, 
17 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 42 (2003). 
 2 Abusive Telemarketing Acts or Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2003). 
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program culminated a decade’s worth of efforts to alleviate consumer 
frustration with unwanted sales calls.  However, on September 27, 2003, 
the District of Colorado derailed the registry, holding that the rule made an 
unconstitutional distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech by covering commercial calls and exempting calls for charitable, 
religious, or political organizations.3 
 
[2]  On February 17, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed the District of Colorado’s ruling, finding that that the 
registry’s provisions comport with First Amendment standards.4  Despite 
this ruling, however, the registry’s future remains in doubt.  Should the 
U.S. Supreme Court reverse the Tenth Circuit, Congress and the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) will need to decide between extending the do-
not-call list provisions to charitable organizations—an alternative that 
presents its own constitutional and policy problems—or dropping the 
initiative.  Accounting for both constitutional and policy factors, the best 
alternative would be to extend the registry’s restrictions to all callers but 
let consumers choose to exempt charitable calls themselves. 
 
II. HISTORY OF DO NOT CALL RULES 
 
[3]  Congress’s efforts to regulate telemarketing began in 1991 with 
passage of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which 
authorized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to promulgate 
rules to protect consumers from unwanted calls.5  The bill authorized, but 
did not require, the creation of a do-not-call list, and the FCC instead 
chose to require telemarketers to maintain company-specific do-not-call 
lists.6  In 1994, Congress passed the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud 
 
 
 3 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo. 
2003), rev’d, No. 03-1429, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2564 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter 
Mainstream I].  The details of the court’s ruling are discussed infra.   
 4 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 03-1429, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2564, at *21 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Mainstream III]. 
 5 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 
310). 
 6 Dean Rodney Smolla, University of Richmond School of Law, Statement to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Sept. 30, 2003), available at 2003 WL 
22259729.  The history of telemarketing regulations is somewhat confusing because of the 
seemingly overlapping mandates and efforts of the FCC and FTC.  While their different 
jurisdictions inevitably lead to some differences in provisions, the FCC and FTC have sought to 
“maximize consistency,” as Congress ordered in the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
6101 (2003).  This note will focus only on the FTC’s efforts. 
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and Abuse Protection Act (TCFAP).7  The TCFAP instructed the FTC to 
create rules to combat “abusive telemarketing acts or practices,” including, 
inter alia, a rule to prohibit “a pattern of unsolicited telephone calls which 
the consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such consumer’s right 
to privacy.”8  The subsequent FTC rules did not create a national do-not-
call registry, but created company-specific regulations, similar to the 
FCC’s rules.9  During a required review of the Telemarketing Sales Rule 
(TSR) in 1999, the FTC received comments suggesting that the company-
specific do-not-call regulation was not effectively protecting consumer 
privacy.10  While the Commission began to consider changes to the rules, 
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which included a provision 
extending the TSR to for-profit telemarketers soliciting charitable 
contributions.11 
 
[4]  In January 2002, to protect consumer privacy against unwanted 
telemarketing calls, the FTC proposed the creation of a national do-not-
call registry by amending the definition of “abusive or deceptive 
telemarketing practices” in the TSR.12  Use of telemarketing had grown 
exponentially since the original TCPA, from eighteen million calls per day 
in 1991 to 104 million per day in 2002.13  Frustration with unwanted calls 
and efforts to control them had similarly grown: consumer complaints 
over such calls increased 1000% between 1998 and 2002,14 and twenty-
eight states had implemented their own do-not-call lists.15   
 
 
 
 7 Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 
(1994). 
 8 Telemarketing Rules, 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3)(A) (2003). 
 9 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii) (2003).  The company-specific 
regulations required sellers and telemarketers to remove a consumer’s telephone number from that 
seller’s list upon request. 
 10 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,582 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
 11 Id. 
 12 “It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice . . . to engage in . . . (iii) initiating any 
outbound call to a person when . . . (B) that person’s telephone number is on the “do-not-call” 
registry, maintained by the Commission, of persons who do not wish to receive outbound telephone 
calls to induce the purchase of goods or services . . . .”  Abusive Telemarketing Acts or Practices, 
16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(2003). 
 13 Cotter, supra note 1. 
 14 149 CONG. REC. H412 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Udall). 
 15 149 CONG. REC. H412 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Stearns).  For an updated 
summary of state do-not-call laws, see http://www.callcompliance.com/regulations/statelist.html. 
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[5]  The FTC’s plan received broad popular support; 33,000 of the 49,000 
comments on the proposed rule supported the do-not-call provision.16  In a 
year when Congress struggled to agree on anything, the do-not-call list 
enjoyed unusually broad bi-partisan support.17  The Do Not Call 
Implementation Act passed the Senate by unanimous consent and passed 
the House 418-7 in February 2003.18  Furthermore, consumers reacted 
enthusiastically; more than fifty million people registered on the do-not-
call list by mid-September 2003.19 
 
[6]  Despite the overwhelmingly positive response from Congress and the 
public, the do-not-call registry faced immediate legal challenges.  While 
Congress quickly responded to a District of Oklahoma ruling that the FTC 
did not have the authority to create a do-not-call registry,20 the District of 
Colorado’s ruling that the do-not-call rules violate the First Amendment 
appeared more problematic.  As already mentioned, this ruling stemmed 
from the FTC’s decision to exempt telemarketers soliciting donations on 
behalf of charities from the national registry requirements.21 
 
III. THE DECISION TO EXEMPT NONPROFITS 
 
[7]  To understand why the FTC exempted telemarketers soliciting for 
charities, one must first understand the reasons behind establishing the 
national registry in the first place.  The overriding concern was consumer 
privacy.  Many members of Congress, rising in support of the registry, 
spoke of protecting the peace and quiet of the home and preventing family 
dinners from being interrupted by unwanted calls.22  The FTC also 
 
 
 16 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,629 n.575 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
 17 See Anne Applebaum, Public Debate Bypassed in Rush to Bill, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 
30, 2003, at 5J, available at 2003 WL 69374703. 
 18 149 CONG. REC. H416 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003) (Roll call Vote No. 26). 
 19 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Do Not Call Registrations Exceed 50 Million 
(Sept. 17, 2003), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/dncnumbers030917.htm. 
 20 See FTC Do-Not-Call Registry Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-82, § 1, 117 Stat. 1006 
(2003) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6102).  This Act provided express authority for the FTC to 
implement the national do-not-call list and was passed in response to U.S. Sec. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 282 F. Supp. 2d. 1285, 1290-93 (W.D. Okla. 2003).  Id. 
 21 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1168.  
 22 149 CONG. REC. H409 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Markey) (“There are 
Members on the left and right, Democrat and Republican, that want privacy in their own homes . . . 
.  Every American believes they have that inherent right.”); Id. (statement of Rep. Barton) (“This is 
another step in the protection of privacy . . . so that when you are in the privacy of your own home, 
if you choose to not have any unsolicited phone calls coming into your home, you can sign up for 
this.”). 
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received numerous comments from consumer groups, law enforcement 
representatives, and other privacy advocates asserting the national 
registry’s improved privacy protection.23  After analyzing the comments 
and testimony collected during its review of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 
the FTC concluded the original company-specific do-not-call provision 
did not effectively protect privacy.24  Besides the company-specific 
regime, which allows a seller’s initial call to invade the consumer’s 
privacy, the Commission specifically found the system placed too heavy a 
burden on consumers, who are forced to repeat their request to be removed 
from a calling list to each individual caller.25  The FTC discovered 
telemarketers often ignored consumer requests, and consumers had no way 
of verifying their removal from the list.26  Despite the consumer’s private 
right of action against telemarketers who ignored removal requests, the 
Commission found the need to keep track of each call and request too 
burdensome for effective enforcement.27  Frustrations stemming from 
unsolicited calls continued, despite the company-specific rules, and 
participants of the do-not-call lists believed a national registry would 
provide a more convenient one-stop method for reducing unwanted calls 
further.28 
 
[8]  In reviewing the FTC’s approach to charitable solicitations, one must 
remember the FTC does not have jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations 
and only recently gained jurisdiction over  telemarketers who act on behalf 
of nonprofits since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001.29  
While the FTC originally planned to regulate charitable solicitations with 
 
 
 23 See, e.g., Letter from Susan Grant, Vice President for Public Policy, National Consumers 
League, to the Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 12, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
comments/dncpapercomments/04/ncl.pdf (regarding Comments of the National Consumers League 
in the Matter of Telemarketing Rulemaking-Comment); Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Executive 
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center, to the Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 10, 2002), 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ dncpapercomments/04/epicetal.pdf (regarding Comments of 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center); Comments from the National Association of Attorneys 
General, to the Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ 
dncpapercomments/04/naag.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). 
 24 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,629 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 310). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 4,631. 
 29 See USA PATRIOT Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2002); Telemarketing Sales Rule Pt. II, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 4,492, 4,516 n.234 (Jan. 30, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).  Thus, telemarketers 
soliciting on behalf of charities were previously not even regulated by the FTC’s company-specific 
rules.  Id. at 4,516. 
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the national registry, it decided only to regulate them under the previous 
company-specific regime for both policy and legal reasons.30 
 
[9]  First, the Commission wanted to balance the need to protect consumers 
with the ability of charities to continue their philanthropic missions.31  
Many of the organizations submitting comments warned that subjecting 
their telemarketers to the national do-not-call registry would drastically 
harm their fundraising capabilities, and that this measure would have a 
disproportionately heavy effect on small charities that lack the capacity for 
in-house solicitation drives.32  Also, although not mentioned anywhere in 
the record, the Commission might have been reticent to hinder political 
fundraising, which surely would have been unpopular in Congress.  At 
least two Congressmen lamented this “loophole” in the rules.33 
 
[10]  The FTC also thought that calls on behalf of charities did not need as 
extensive regulation as commercial calls.34  While unwilling to exempt 
charitable calls completely, noting that even charitable calls intrude on 
privacy to some degree, the Commission decided that the more 
intermediate step of requiring organization-specific do-not-call lists was 
more appropriate than forcing compliance with the full registry because 
charitable calls were less likely to be “abusive.”35  Charities’ incentives 
differ from those of commercial telemarketers because solicitation calls 
are about more than money; the call recipient is “also a voter, a 
constituent, a consumer, a source of information to others, and a potential 
source of a future contribution.”36  Thus charitable callers are presumably 
more likely to honor a consumer’s do-not-call requests.37  Furthermore, 
while the Commission had found evidence suggesting that company-
specific rules were insufficient to control unwanted commercial calls, they 
had no such evidence regarding charitable calls.38  Thus, the Commission 
seemed willing to give charitable telemarketers the opportunity to avoid 
 
 
 30 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,637 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
 31 Id. at 4,592. 
 32 See, e.g., Comments of the Direct Marketing Ass’n Nonprofit Federation, to the Federal 
Trade Commission (Apr. 15, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/ 
dmanonprofit.pdf.  These claims will be discussed in more detail infra. 
 33 149 CONG. REC. H412 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003) (statements of Reps. Barton and McCarthy). 
 34 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,637 (Jan. 29, 2003).   
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 4,589 (quoting Letter from Hudson Bay Company of Illinois, to the Federal Trade 
Commission (Apr. 17, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/hbc.pdf). 
 37 Id. at 4,637. 
 38 Id. at 4,629. 
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greater regulation, while reserving the right to augment the company-
specific approach should it prove ineffective.39 
 
[11]  Finally, the FTC did not include charitable solicitations in the national 
do-not-call provisions because it feared a First Amendment challenge.40  
In its final rule making, the Commission acknowledged the “higher degree 
of protection” extended to charitable versus commercial solicitation.41  It 
thought that only compelling charitable solicitors to comply with 
company-specific regulations presented an appropriate balance between 
charities’ free speech rights and the need to protect consumer privacy.42  
Ironically, this distinction between the regulations applicable to 
commercial and noncommercial speech, which was meant to prevent a 
clash with the First Amendment, became the grounds on which the District 
of Colorado overturned the rules.43   
 
IV. MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES V. FTC 
 
A. The District of Colorado’s Decision 
 
[12]  Because the challenge to the national do-not-call registry provision 
covers only commercial speech (speech which merely proposes a financial 
transaction), the District of Colorado examined the rules using the 
framework established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission. of New York.44  Under Central Hudson, the First 
Amendment protects commercial speech unless the speech is misleading 
or false.45  Commercial speech does, however, receive less protection than, 
say, charitable speech, and the government can regulate it if (1) the 
government asserts a substantial interest, (2) the restriction on commercial 
speech directly and materially advances that interest, and (3) the 
regulation is narrowly tailored so it does not excessively limit the 
speech.46 
 
 
 
 39 Id. at 4,637. 
 40 Id. at 4,629.   
 41 Id. at 4,586. 
 42 Id. at 4,592.                                                                                                                                                                                          
 43 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1171. 
 44 Id. at 1159; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of New York, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 45 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
 46 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1161; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
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[13]  The district court found that the do-not-call rules clearly amounted to 
a government restriction of commercial speech implicating the First 
Amendment.47  In regulating “all outbound telephone calls to induce the 
purchase of goods or services,”48 without regard to truthfulness, the rules 
would certainly affect some truthful (i.e. protected) commercial speech.49  
The court believed that this regulation amounted to a government 
restriction because, by covering only commercial speech, the government 
was “entangling [itself] in deciding what speech consumers should 
hear.”50 
 
[14]  Proceeding into the Central Hudson analysis, the court acknowledged 
that the FTC had asserted the following two substantial public interests: 
(1) protecting privacy and (2) curbing deceptive and abusive telemarketing 
practices.51  As the court noted, the Supreme Court has recognized 
protecting the privacy of the home as “of the highest order,” which 
includes the right to avoid unwanted communications.52  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has identified protecting consumers from deception and 
mistreatment as a substantial government interest.53  Thus, both asserted 
interests can justify the FTC’s rules if they fulfill the remaining Central 
Hudson criteria.54 
 
[15]  However, the district court decided under the second Central Hudson 
element that the FTC’s rules unjustifiably distinguished between calls 
based on content.55  From the outset both parties agreed that both 
charitable and commercial telemarketing calls invade privacy; however, 
the do-not-call rules do not apply to all unwanted calls.56  The FTC argued 
that the rules did materially advance the interest of protecting privacy, 
because they would eliminate between forty to sixty percent of unwanted 
 
 
 47 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1162. 
 48 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(2003). 
 49 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1162. 
 50 Id. at 1163. 
 51 Id. at 1164. 
 52 Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 
(1988)). 
 53 Id. (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979)).  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 1165.  The “materially advances” and “narrowly tailored” prongs together create a 
requirement for “reasonable fit.”  The district court decided the case under the “materially 
advances” prong, but used the same analysis the Supreme Court used in discussing “reasonable fit” 
in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).  Since the court claims to decide the 
case under the second prong, that is how the analysis is presented here. 
 56 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1165. 
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telemarketing calls.57  The plaintiffs conversely argued that the FTC could 
not justify a distinction between commercial and noncommercial calls 
because all the calls were equally unwanted and intrusive.58 
 
[16]  The court’s decision turned on an interpretation of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc..59  In Discovery Network, the city of Cincinnati, 
as part of a plan to beautify the city and increase safety on sidewalks, 
prohibited the distribution of commercial hand bills through news racks on 
public property.60  The city, however, allowed traditional newspapers, 
which contained both commercial and political speech, to continue using 
news racks.61  The Supreme Court noted two problems with the city’s 
ordinance.  First, hand bill news racks represented only three percent of 
the city’s news racks; thus, removing them would do little to advance the 
city’s interest in esthetics and safety.62  Secondly, the Supreme Court 
asserted that the city had placed too much emphasis on the distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial speech, and that it is 
impermissible to make such a distinction when “the distinction bears no 
relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has 
asserted.”63 
 
[17]  The court in Mainstream accepted the FTC’s argument that the do-
not-call rules advanced the interest of protecting privacy much more than 
Cincinnati’s ordinance furthered the interest of beauty and safety in 
Discovery Network.  The court also noted that if this were the only issue, 
the FTC would prevail.64  In fact, the court quoted the Supreme Court’s 
assertion that “the government is not required to make progress on every 
front before it can make progress on any front.”65   
 
[18]  However, according to the district court, the FTC could not 
sufficiently justify its distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.  The court claimed that there was no evidence in the 
administrative record to support the FTC’s assertion that commercial 
 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 60 Id. at 412. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 417. 
 63 Id. at 424. 
 64 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1165. 
 65 Id. at 1166 (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993)). 
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callers were more likely to engage in fraudulent or abusive practices.66  It 
also found that the FTC’s decision to exempt charitable callers based on 
the lesser protection given to commercial speech contradicted the law 
articulated in Discovery Network.67  Finally, the court rejected the 
Commission’s assertion that the commercial/charitable distinction was 
based on “secondary effects”68 because the secondary effects are the same 
for both types of calls.  Having found that the FTC made a decision to 
burden one type of speech based on its content without a privacy or 
prevention-of-abuse rationale for distinguishing it from other speech, the 
court declared the do-not-call rules unconstitutional and declined to 
address the third Central Hudson prong.69 
 
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Reversal 
  
[19]  On February 17, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court of Colorado, finding that the do-
not-call rules satisfied the Central Hudson criteria.  According to the 
appellate court’s interpretation of Central Hudson, the registry should 
survive scrutiny “if it is designed to provide effective support for the 
government’s purposes and if the government did not suppress an 
excessive amount of speech when substantially narrower restrictions 
would have worked just as well.”70   
 
[20]  In examining the registry’s effectiveness, the appellate court rejected 
the district court’s theory that the rules were impermissibly 
underinclusive.  The court noted that “First Amendment challenges based 
on underinclusiveness face an uphill battle in the commercial speech 
context,”71 explaining that underinclusiveness is only relevant if it makes 
the regulatory framework so irrational as to be ineffective.72  Far from 
being ineffective, the court stated the do-not-call rules would block a 
sizable number of unwanted calls (approximately 6.85 billion calls to 
those already registered on the list), as well as a substantial  percentage of 
 
 
 66 Id. at 1167. 
 67 Id. 
 68 The argument is that the regulation aims at eliminating the “secondary effect” of constant 
phone calls, which is separate from the content of the call.  See id. 
 69Id. at 1168.   
 70 Mainstream III, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2564, at *21. 
 71 Id. at *22. 
 72 Id. at *22-*23 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995); Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)). 
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unwanted calls (citing Congress’s and the FTC’s findings that most 
unwanted solicitations were commercial).73  Significantly, the appellate 
court also accepted the FTC’s finding that commercial callers generate 
more privacy complaints and are more likely to engage in abusive 
practices than noncommercial callers,74 whereas the district court had 
found no evidence for such a distinction.75  Thus, the appellate court found 
that the do-not-call list is not “so underinclusive that it fails materially to 
advance the government’s goals.”76 
 
[21]  The appellate court also found that the rules were narrowly tailored, 
placing particular emphasis on the role of private choice in assuring that 
only unwanted calls are preempted.77  The court pointed to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. 
Village of Stratton,78 Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,79 
and Martin v. City of Struthers80 to illustrate the preference of private 
choice as a less restrictive alternative to direct prohibitions on speech.81  
Comparing the do-not-call list to the regulation in Rowan, the court argued 
that the registry, by definition, would only block calls that were 
unwanted.82  The court found further evidence of narrow tailoring in the 
facts: (1) that sellers and consumers would retain numerous options to 
send and receive solicitations and (2) that plaintiffs could find no equally 
effective alternatives to the national registry.83 
 
[22]  Finally, the appellate court rejected the district court’s interpretation 
and application of Discovery Network.  The Tenth Circuit believed that the 
key finding in Discovery Network was that regulating only three percent of 
 
 
 73 Id. at *26-*27. 
 74 Id. at *29.  The court emphasized that the original commercial/noncommercial distinction 
arose in the House of Representative’s report on the TCPA in 1991, and that Congress, the FCC, 
and the FTC have all continued to find commercial callers most responsible for the harms of 
privacy invasion and abusive practices.  See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 16 (1991). 
 75 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d. at 1167. 
 76 Mainstream III, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2564, at *32. 
 77 Id. at *33-*34. 
 78 536 U.S. 150, 168-69 (2002) (stating that allowing residents to post their own “no 
solicitation” signs was less restrictive than requiring permits for solicitation). 
 79 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) (upholding a statute allowing homeowners to prohibit specific 
parties from sending them mailings). 
 80 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943) (striking down an ordinance banning door-to-door canvassing 
because it prevented private homeowners from deciding whether to receive visitors). 
 81 Mainstream III, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2564, at *33-*36 (citations omitted). 
 82 Id. at *34. 
 83 Id. at *38-*40. 
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the city’s news racks would not materially advance the government’s 
interest.84  The language upon which the district court focused merely 
stated that limiting a measure to commercial speech would not save a 
regulation that has only minimal impact.85  Thus, as applied by the 
appellate court, Discovery Network holds that a regulation is 
impermissible where it both had a minimal impact and was based on a 
commercial/noncommercial distinction that bore no relation to the harm 
being targeted.86  The Court of Appeals asserted that neither factor was 
present in the do-not-call case.  It noted that the registry would block a 
substantial amount of calls, in contrast to the paltry effect of the Discovery 
Network regulation.87  More significantly, the appellate court disagreed 
with the district court by accepting the FTC’s arguments that commercial 
calls are indeed significantly more problematic than noncommercial calls 
and that the past failures to successfully regulate commercial calls justified 
covering the commercial calls by the national registry while exempting 
noncommercial calls.88 
 
[23]  However, whether the FTC will ultimately prevail is still in doubt.  
Although the appellate court overruled the district court’s decision, the 
plaintiffs will most likely appeal to the Supreme Court.  Given the 
nuanced, and sometime conflicting, application of the commercial speech 
doctrine, the Supreme Court could very well grant certiorari.  As Dean 
Rodney Smolla of the University of Richmond School of Law testified,  
 
No one, of course, can predict with complete confidence what . . . 
the Supreme Court, will do when the Mainstream Marketing 
decision is reviewed on the merits.  Congress would be prudent not 
to proceed, however, on the supposition that Mainstream 
Marketing is some kind of . . . outlying . . . decision that is 
obviously wrong and heading for certain reversal.89 
   
Subsequently, Congress and the FTC should consider alternatives to cure 
the do-not-call rules’ constitutional faults. 
 
 
 
 84 Id. at *44-*45 (citations omitted). 
 85 Id. at *45 (“[A] regulation that has only a minimal impact on the identified problem cannot 
be saved simply because it targets only commercial speech . . . .”). 
 86 Id. at *45-*46. 
 87 Id. at *45. 
 88 Id. at *46. 
 89 See Smolla, supra note 6, at *10. 
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V. OPTIONS AFTER MAINSTREAM: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
[24]  If the U.S. Supreme Court decides to overturn the Tenth Circuit’s 
ruling, the FTC has three potential options for saving the registry: (1) 
extend the registry to cover all calls by professional telemarketers 
regardless of the purpose, (2) extend the registry to noncommercial calls 
but give registrants the opportunity to identify specific charities who may 
continue calling them, or (3) create a “bifurcated” registry which covers 
all calls, but also gives registrants the opportunity to exempt all 
noncommercial calls, or all commercial calls, if desired.90  In judging each 
permutation, the Commission and Congress need to consider both the 
relative harm to charitable organizations and the likelihood that the 
amended rules themselves will survive constitutional scrutiny. 
 
[25]  Extending the do-not-call registry to telemarketing calls made on 
behalf of charitable organizations in any form would undoubtedly hinder 
charitable fundraising, especially for certain types of organizations.  In the 
year 2000, charitable organizations received approximately twenty-seven 
percent of their donations through telephone solicitations, compared to 
nineteen percent through direct mail and thirty-eight percent from person-
to-person solicitations.91  Of all donations raised by telephone, 
approximately sixty to seventy percent were solicited by professional 
telemarketers.92  The FTC estimated that forty to fifty percent of all 
households will sign up for the do-not-call list.93  This could shrink the 
potential telephone solicitation donor pool and support charitable 
 
 
 90 Id.; see also Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2003).  
The authors argue that unwanted telemarketing calls can be reduced by forcing telemarketers to 
“internalize” all the costs of their methods.  Thus, the authors propose a system whereby consumers 
could set a price at which they are willing to listen to telemarketing calls; telemarketers would need 
to reimburse these consumers if they chose to call, through a system akin to 1-900 numbers.  
Because the authors advocate for exempting telemarketers for charitable organizations from this 
system, their solution still does not avoid the constitutional problems presented by Mainstream, and 
subsequently, their proposal is not analyzed in this article. 
 91 Michael A. Turner & Lawrence G. Buc, The Impact of Data Restrictions on Fundraising for 
Charitable & Nonprofit Institutions (2004), at 9 (on file with the Richmond Journal of Law & 
Technology). 
 92 Jeff Jones, Do Not Call Registry Could Hurt Charities, THE NONPROFIT TIMES (May 1, 
2002), at http://www.nptimes.com/May02/npt1.html. 
 93 Comments of the Not-For-Profit and Charitable Coalition, to the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Proposed Amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule (Apr. 15, 2002), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/notforprofit.pdf. 
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organizations’ fear that the registry will significantly harm their ability to 
raise funds.94 
 
[26]  Furthermore, extending the do-not-call list would especially harm 
smaller charitable and nonprofit organizations.  Smaller charities are more 
likely to rely on professional telemarketers because they lack the resources 
to conduct in-house fundraising drives.95  Most universities, hospitals, and 
religious organizations have individuals with a particular allegiance to 
their institutions (e.g. alumni, patients, churchgoers) and raise most of 
their funds through large gifts solicited person-to-person.96  Food banks, 
soup kitchens, and public television stations, by contrast, cannot rely on 
such constituents.97  Subsequently, charities without a solid and committed 
donor base must rely more heavily on cold-call solicitations.98  Thus, 
while thirty-eight percent of all charitable donations may come from 
person-to-person solicitations, very little of this slice goes to certain types 
of (often smaller) charities; for these organizations, the percentage of 
donations received through telephone solicitations is likely to be much 
higher than twenty-seven percent. 
 
[27]  In addition to reducing donor pools, charities assert that imposing do-
not-call restrictions will raise fundraising costs, in effect diverting more 
money away from their missions.99  Solicitors would need to “scrub” their 
telemarketing lists regularly to comply with the registry and keep 
extensive records of previous donations.100  Commercial telemarketers 
would certainly pass these costs along to the charities.101  The DMA 
Nonprofit Federation explained in its comments to the FTC that unlike 
commercial organizations that can incorporate cost increases into the price 
of their products, charities cannot ask donors to increase their 
contributions to cover increased soliciting costs.102 
 
 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Turner & Buc, supra note 91, at 9. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See, e.g., Letter from Paulette V. Maehara, President & CEO, Association of Fundraising 
Professionals, to the Federal Trade Commission, at 5 (Mar. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/aofp.pdf. 
 100 Comments of the DMA Nonprofit Federation, supra note 32, at 15. 
 101 Letter from Paulette V. Maehara, supra note 99. 
 102 Comments of the DMA Nonprofit Federation, supra note 32, at 15. 
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[28]  The effects of extending the registry, however, may not be as 
disastrous as nonprofit groups assert.  While the do-not-call list could 
eliminate calls to a sizable portion of the potential donor base, nonprofits 
will still be able to call their pre-existing donors and volunteers.103 The 
amended rules could allow nonprofits to contact consumers with whom 
they have an established relationship, similar to the current exception 
given to commercial telemarketers.104  Whereas the commercial exception 
is limited to consumers who have made a financial transaction with the 
company within the last eighteen months, or called with inquiries within 
the last three months,105 the Commission could tailor the definition to the 
reality of philanthropic giving habits, as long as it fits the “reasonable” 
expectation of consumers.106   
 
[29]  For example, recognizing that even dedicated donors do not 
necessarily give every year, “established relationship” could include 
individuals who have donated to a charity within two years, instead of 
eighteen months.  Similarly, the definition could include people who have 
purchased something from the organization (say, a symphony ticket), 
volunteered their time, or merely attended an organization event.  This 
exception should allow charities to keep calling individuals who have 
donated to them in the past, and allow the charities to conduct a reasonable 
amount of “prospecting” for new donors by contacting those who have 
shown some interest in their organization.  Furthermore, since such 
individuals probably constitute a large portion of nonprofits’ calling lists, 
the exemption could limit the “scrubbing” costs mentioned above. 
 
[30]  Additionally, even if the registry prevented charities from calling 
some individuals, these organizations could compensate by placing greater 
emphasis on other modes of communication (“channel switching”).  For 
example, while direct mail currently accounts for a smaller percentage of 
donations than telephone solicitation, it is still a reasonably effective 
method of fundraising.  A recent study by the marketing firm Vertis found 
that fifty-three percent of adults read fundraising and nonprofit mail, while 
forty-six percent had responded to a direct mailing within the previous 
 
 
 103 Letter from Paulette V. Maehara, supra note 99, at 4. 
 104 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii) (2003). 
 105 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(n) (2003). 
 106 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,591 (Jan. 29, 2003) (noting that, in 
defining “established business relationship,” the Commission had referred to Congress’s intent in 
the TCPA that the exemption reflect a reasonable consumer expectation). 
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thirty days, up from only thirty-four percent in 2001.107  Alternatively, 
charities could begin using e-mail more often to solicit donations.108 
 
[31]  Moreover, even if the do-not-call registry shrinks the total number of 
potential call recipients by forty to fifty percent, it is unlikely to have a 
proportional impact on the amount of money raised by charities.  Given 
the exception for previous donors and volunteers discussed above, the 
registry would actually only shrink the donor pool to people with no 
particular reason to give to the specific charity.  Considering that the list 
eliminates people that presumably react negatively to telemarketing calls 
in general, the registry would really only prevent charities from soliciting 
a very unlikely group of donors. 
 
[32]  The options that give consumers greater flexibility and choice for 
exempting nonprofit callers themselves could further mitigate the potential 
harm to charitable fundraising.  One option would be to make all 
charitable calls to do-not-call registrants de facto illegal but allow the 
organizations to seek express permission to call the individual.  By 
allowing nonprofits to identify individuals who do not meet the technical 
requirements of an “existing relationship” exception but still want to hear 
from, and possibly donate to, the organization, this proposal could 
diminish the “shrinking donor pool” effect.  The current rule actually 
contains this provision for commercial callers, requiring that the caller 
obtain permission in writing.109  However, when the Commission 
proposed a similar provision for charitable solicitation, nonprofits 
uniformly condemned it as too costly and difficult to implement.110  For 
example, the DMA Nonprofit Federation claimed that obtaining “opt-in” 
permission from consumers would increase fundraising costs to charities 
by $5.9 billion.111 
 
 
 107 Press Release, Association of Fundraising Professionals, Survey Confirms: Direct Mail Still 
Has Impact (Aug. 29, 2003), at http://www.afpnet.org/tier3_cd.cfm?content_item_id= 
13431&folder_id=2165 (last visited Mar. 25, 2004); see also Press Release, Vertis Inc., Two-Thirds 
of the Nation Plan to Make a Non-Monetary Contribution, at 
http://www.vertisinc.com/about/viewNews.asp?id=92 (last visited Mar. 21, 2004).  
 108 See CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. No. 108-187, § 7701(a)(12), 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701-13; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1037; 28 U.S.C. § 994; and 47 U.S.C. § 227) 
(revealing that with Congress enacting the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, the opportunity to replace 
telemarketing with email may not exist much longer). 
 109 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(B)(i) (2003). 
 110 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,636. 
 111 See Comments of the DMA Nonprofit Federation, to the Federal Trade Commission, at 2 
(Apr. 15, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/dmanonprofit.pdf  
(recognizing that the note the study cited examined efforts to obtain permission to use personal 
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[33]  The third option of “bifurcating” the do-not-call registry, however, 
may offer the best solution.  Under this approach, the registry would 
separate commercial and noncommercial calls into separate categories, 
allowing registrants to block all telemarketing calls or to sign up to block 
only commercial calls while allowing charitable ones (or vice versa).112  
The bifurcated list should eliminate nonprofits’ fears that consumers 
seeking protection from unwanted sales calls will unintentionally put 
themselves beyond the reach of charities they support.113  Nonprofit 
fundraisers could argue that many individuals would choose to block 
charitable calls when considering them as a category but would not make 
the same choice when considering individual charities separately.  While 
this assertion may very well be accurate, the bifurcated list still represents 
a good compromise between automatically blocking charitable calls to 
registrants and putting the onus on individuals to put themselves on each 
charity’s individual do-not-call list.  If the bifurcated system included an 
option for charities to become exempt by obtaining individual express 
permission, expensive and difficult as that may be, it could allow 
nonprofits to continue calling those that are most likely to donate while 
putting commercial and noncommercial calls on sufficiently equal footing 
to satisfy the Mainstream I decision. 
 
[34]  The Commission suggested a bifurcated registry in its request for 
comments, but received relatively few responses with only general 
comments.114  Responding to the question “Should the ‘do-not-call’ 
registry be structured so that requests not to receive telemarketing calls to 
induce the purchase of goods and services are handled separately from 
requests not to receive calls soliciting charitable contributions,” sixty out 
of one hundred individuals said “yes.”115  The National Consumers 
League, a nonprofit organization representing the consumers’ economic 
and social interests, also expressed support for separating requests to block 
charitable and commercial calls, although it did not elaborate on the 
position.116  However, the New York Consumer Protection Board 
                                                                                                                         
identifying information for marketing purposes, not for telemarketing specifically); see also Turner 
& Buc, supra note 91, at 4. 
 112 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,636; see also Smolla, supra note 6.  
 113 See, e.g., Letter from Barbara Reid, Executive Director, Childhood Leukemia Foundation, 
to the Federal Trade Commission, at 2 (Feb. 25, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ 
dncpapercomments/04/clf.pdf 
 114 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,636; see also Telemarketing Sales Rule, 67 
Fed. Reg. 4,492, 4,539 (Jan. 30, 2003). 
 115 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,637. 
 116 Letter from Susan Grant, supra note 23. 
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(NYCPB) vaguely suggested that bifurcation might cause technical 
problems while imposing high administration costs.117  The National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) also suggested that offering 
too many options might confuse consumers with unnecessary 
complexity.118 
 
[35]  The cost and complexity concerns raised by NYCPB and NAAG 
convinced the FTC not to pursue the bifurcated solution initially.119  
However, despite these valid points, the Commission should reconsider 
this option.  First, the effects of bifurcation may not be as detrimental as 
feared.  The NYCPB presented its cost analysis in response to a proposal 
to allow consumers to specify days and times when they would accept 
telemarketing calls, later saying that bifurcation might experience the 
same technical and cost problems.120  NAAG dealt with the “days and 
times” proposal simultaneously with bifurcation; thus, its concerns about 
proliferating options and rapid choices may refer more to the “days and 
times” issue, which would require several steps, other than bifurcation, 
which involves one simple choice.121  Moreover, the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), which represents the constituency 
perhaps most likely to be confused by multiple choices presented by an 
automated telephone enrollment system, endorsed giving consumers 
options with a series of prompts.122  Thus, the concern that a bifurcated 
registry would confuse consumers may be exaggerated.  
 
[36]  Furthermore, the context in which the Commission discarded the 
bifurcation solution has changed.  When the FTC deemed this option 
“excessively cumbersome,”123 it believed that subjecting charitable calls 
only to organization-specific do-not-call lists, while imposing the national 
list on commercial callers, would pass constitutional scrutiny.  But if the 
Commission must extend the registry to satisfy a holding similar to the 
district court’s decision, it might find that the benefit of keeping the 
 
 
 117 Letter from the New York Consumer Protection Board, to the Federal Trade Commission 
(Mar. 26, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/naag.pdf.   
 118 Comments and Recommendations of the National Association of Attorneys General, supra 
note 23, at 20. 
 119 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,637. 
 120 Letter from the New York Consumer Protection Board, supra note 117. 
 121 Comments and Recommendations of the National Association of Attorneys General, supra 
note 23, at 20. 
 122 Letter from David Certner, Acting Director, AARP, to the Federal Trade Commission, at 3 
(Mar. 29, 2002), at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/aarp.pdf.  
 123 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,637. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume X, Issue 4 
registry while mitigating harm to charities is worth the extra cost and 
complexity of bifurcation. 
 
VI. NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
[37]  Any amended rules extending the do-not-call registry to charitable 
solicitations would undoubtedly face their own constitutional challenges.  
After striking down the original rules as unconstitutional in Mainstream I, 
the United States District Court in Colorado suggested that “[w]ere the do-
not-call registry to apply without regard to the content of speech, or to 
leave autonomy in the hands of the individual, as in Rowan, it might be a 
different matter.”124  However, even if extending the registry to charities 
made the provision sufficiently content-neutral, or if bifurcation gave 
individual’s sufficient autonomy, to satisfy the Mainstream ruling, 
attempting to regulate charitable fundraising would  require another level 
of constitutional analysis.   
 
[38]  Charitable solicitations receive greater protection under the First 
Amendment than pure commercial speech because they are “intertwined 
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for 
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social 
issues.”125  Although the Central Hudson test for commercial speech no 
longer applies, the government can still impose  
 
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and that they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”126 
 
[39]  Thus, the first question is whether the extended do-not-call registry 
would be “content-neutral.”  This issue is paramount because content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.127  According to the Supreme 
 
 
 124 Mainstream I, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. 
 125 Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
 126 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).  
 127 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
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Court, the main issue in determining content neutrality is whether the 
government chose to regulate the speech at issue because of disagreement 
with its message.128  A regulation is neutral if its purpose is unrelated to 
the content, even if there is an incidental effect on some speakers but not 
others.129  For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, New York 
City’s sound amplification guidelines required for using its Central Park 
band shell were deemed neutral because their justification, controlling 
noise in order to prevent disturbing residential neighborhoods, had nothing 
to do with the types of music or other sound being amplified.130  Under 
this logic, amended do-not-call rules appear to be content-neutral.  The 
registry would apply to all solicitations within the FTC’s jurisdiction, 
regardless of content.  Just as Ward’s sound ordinance aimed at protecting 
neighborhood peace without regards to the type of music played, the 
government’s purpose here is to protect privacy from unwanted calls, not 
to eliminate a specific message. 
 
[40]  However, the District of North Dakota’s recent decision in Fraternal 
Order of Police v. Stenehjem, overturning the North Dakota state do-not-
call list, suggests that the amended rules would not be content-neutral.131  
That case asserts that distinguishing between charities that use 
professional telemarketers and those who use employees or volunteers to 
make calls is a content-based distinction because it requires the 
government to look at the type of speech involved.132  But this 
interpretation of “content-based” seems suspect.  In support of its decision, 
the court cited Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, where the 
Supreme Court struck down a tax-exemption granted to newspapers and 
magazines on certain topics (sports, religion, and trade) but not other 
magazines.133  But whereas the rule in Ragland required the government to 
examine the topics of articles, the statute in Stenehjem and the national do-
not-call rules do not differentiate based on the topic of the call or the 
words being used, only the method of delivery (professional telemarketer 
vs. in-house employee or volunteer).  Thus, whether another court would 
similarly find this distinction to be “content-based” is uncertain. 
 
 
 
 128 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 792. 
 131 Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1031 (D.N.D. 2003). 
 132 Id. at 1028. 
 133 Id. (citing Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)). 
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[41]  Showing that an extended do-not-call registry is “narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest”134 will be even more difficult.  
The FTC’s asserted interests – protecting privacy and preventing fraud – 
remain significant government interests.135  However, the nonprofit groups 
opposing application of the do-not-call registry to charitable calls argue 
that the regulations are not “narrowly tailored” to further these interests.136  
A regulation is “narrowly tailored” if it is aimed at the “appropriately 
targeted evil.”137  While it does not have to be the “least restrictive” 
method of achieving its goals, the regulation cannot “burden substantially 
more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate 
interests.”138  
 
[42]  An extended do-not-call list would probably not be “narrowly 
tailored” for preventing fraud.  In Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better 
Environment, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that aimed to 
reduce fraud by prohibiting solicitation by charitable organizations that 
did not use at least seventy-five percent of the proceeds for “charitable 
purposes.”139  The court found that using a certain percentage of funds on 
noncharitable activities (e.g. fundraising, salaries, and overhead) was not 
an accurate proxy for fraudulent behavior, and that lumping together 
legitimate charities that use more funds for these activities with 
organizations fraudulently disguising a money-making operation as a 
charity unnecessarily interfered with First Amendment freedoms.140  It 
also noted that “broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are 
suspect.”141  Justifying the do-not-call rules based on fraud prevention 
essentially argues for a broad prophylaxis, restricting charitable 
solicitations by professional telemarketers out of fear the some might be 
fraudulent.  As the District of North Dakota found in Stenehjem, “[n]ot 
every professional telemarketer hired by a charity will engage in 
fraudulent activity, so this law targets and eliminates more ‘than the exact 
 
 
 134 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 135 See Hill v. Colorado., 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 
(1988); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). 
 136 Comments of the DMA Nonprofit Federation, supra note 32, at 8; Comments of the Not-
For-Profit and Charitable Coalition, supra note 93, at 38. 
 137 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485. 
 138 Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 
 139 Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620,  633-34 (1980); see also Riley v. 
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec’y of State v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 
(1984). 
 140 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637. 
 141 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
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source of evil it seeks to remedy.’”142  For example, in Ward, the Supreme 
Court found that the city’s sound amplification guidelines were narrowly 
tailored because they did not materially interfere with the performer’s 
artistic control over sound mix (i.e. content).  The court also found that the 
fact that the regulations reduced the artist’s potential audience was 
insignificant because there were adequate alternative avenues of 
communication.143 
 
[43]  The Supreme Court has, however, endorsed rules analogous to the do-
not-call list for protecting privacy.  While the Court has consistently struck 
down attempts by municipalities to preemptively stop solicitors from 
knocking on doors by requiring them to obtain licenses or notify the police 
in advance,144 it has recognized and sanctioned provisions giving 
individuals the ability to prevent intrusive solicitations.  In Martin v. City 
of Struthers, the Court said that a city could “punish those who call at a 
home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant . . . .”145  
Similarly, while the Schaumburg court struck down the seventy-five 
percent rule as too expansive, it pointed to “No Soliciting” signs as a 
provision that protected privacy while intruding less on freedom of 
speech.146 
 
[44]  The extended do-not-call list is “narrowly tailored” in the sense that it 
burdens no more speech than necessary to advance consumers’ express 
desire not to be bothered.  Whereas using a certain percentage of solicited 
funds for non-charitable activities bears little relationship to the likelihood 
that a charity’s solicitation is fraudulent, calling an individual who has 
explicitly requested not to be called clearly intrudes on privacy.  Unlike 
the ordinance struck down in Martin, the do-not-call rules do not 
substitute the government’s judgment of what is intrusive for the 
individual’s judgment.147  The fact that signing up for the do-not-call list is 
voluntary and that an individual can still choose to sign up for 
organization-specific lists rather than the national registry reduces the 
 
 
 142 Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029 (D.N.D. 2003) 
(quoting Thorburn v. Austin, 231 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
 143 Ward, 491 U.S. at 802. 
 144 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Straton, 536 
U.S. 150 (2002); Hynes v. Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1941). 
 145 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943). 
 146 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 639. 
 147 Martin, 319 U.S. at 143-144. 
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likelihood that the rules will preempt speech that the individual would 
want to hear.  A bifurcated registry system would further tailor the 
provisions by giving options to consumers who only find one type of calls 
intrusive.  Furthermore, like the regulations in Ward, the do-not-call list 
does not interfere with the content of the callers’ messages.  While it 
reduces the potential audience for the message, it leaves the callers with 
viable alternative avenues of communication (e.g. mail and person-to-
person solicitation). 
 
[45]  Yet, charitable and nonprofit organizations have several arguments 
that the registry would not be “narrowly tailored.”  First, they argue that if 
the statutes in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, Secretary of 
Maryland v. Munson, and Schaumburg, which only restricted some 
charitable solicitations by professional telemarketers, were not “narrowly 
tailored,” then the do-not-call list, which prohibits all solicitations to list 
registrants, must be more suspect.148  This argument, however, fails to 
recognize that Riley,149 Munson,150 and Schaumburg were all decided with 
respect to the government’s interest in preventing fraud, not protecting 
privacy.151 
 
[46]  Another argument that charitable and non-profit organizations could 
make focuses on the FTC’s position in the district court.  As noted above, 
the FTC argued in the district court that it was justified to subject only 
charitable calls to organization-specific lists because charities were less 
likely to engage in abusive behavior and there was no evidence that the 
organization-specific lists would not be effective.152  Thus, nonprofit 
organizations could argue that subjecting their organization to the national 
do-not-call list sweeps too broadly because there is a less restrictive means 
of achieving the government’s interest.  The answer to this dilemma may 
turn on whether the do-not-call rules are content-neutral.  The time, place, 
and manner analysis for content-neutral regulations does not require that 
the regulations be the “least restrictive . . . means of” serving the 
government’s interest.153  However, strict scrutiny of regulations 
restricting protected speech requires that the government choose the “least 
 
 
 148 Comments of the DMA Nonprofit Federation, supra note 32, at 10. 
 149 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 150 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
 151 See, e.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 793; Munson, 467 U.S. at 967. 
 152 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,637 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
 153 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
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restrictive means.”154  Obviously, the existence of the organization-
specific lists would have more importance if the latter test applies.155  If 
the easier standard applies, one could argue that choosing the national 
registry approach over the organization-specific approach is a “reasonable 
determination” by a “responsible decision-maker” as to how best to pursue 
the government’s interest.156  
 
[47]  However, the most damaging “narrowly tailored” argument could be 
that the do-not-call list is inherently underinclusive.  As already discussed, 
the FTC’s jurisdiction does not cover nonprofits, so its do-not-call list only 
covers charities that use professional telemarketers.157  The DMA 
Nonprofit Federation argues that, because there is no evidence that calls 
from professional telemarketers on behalf of charities are more intrusive 
than calls made directly from charities themselves, the registry rules do 
not even pass the less strict “reasonable fit” test for commercial speech, 
much less the “narrowly tailored” test.158  The Federation relies on the 
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Pearson v. Edgar, which held that a statute 
allowing homeowners to ban real estate agents from soliciting door-to-
door failed the Central Hudson test because there was no evidence that 
real estate soliciting, compared to any other type of soliciting, posed a 
particular threat to privacy.159  The Seventh Circuit had upheld the same 
statute ten years earlier in Curtis v. Thompson,160 but felt compelled to 
reverse its decision based on Discovery Network, which also invalidated 
an underinclusive ban.161  The District of North Dakota used this same 
reasoning in Stenehjem, finding that regulating charities that use 
professional telemarketers and allowing calls directly from charities meant 
that the state’s do-not-call rules were not “narrowly tailored.”162 
 
 
 
 154 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also Comments 
of the DMA Nonprofit Federation, supra note 32, at 10. 
 155 If the district court’s ruling in Mainstream I (that the FTC cannot subject charitable callers 
to only organization-specific do-not-call lists while subjecting commercial callers to a national 
registry) were upheld, then a ruling that the FTC could not subject charitable callers to the national 
registry because it is not the “least restrictive means” would create an impossible catch-22. 
 156 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. 
 157 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2000).  
 158 Comments of the DMA Nonprofit Federation, supra note 32, at 10. 
 159 Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 405 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 160 Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1305 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 161 Pearson, 153 F.3d  at 405; see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 430-31 (1993). 
 162 Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029 (D.N.D. 2003).   
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[48]  The government could respond by arguing that the reading of 
Discovery Network is too broad.  The ordinance in Discovery Network was 
not just underinclusive, but was also content-based (commercial vs. 
noncommercial).163  The court disapproved of the measure because it 
placed too much emphasis on the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech, singling out commercial speech because it is less 
protected.164  The FTC’s do-not-call rules, by contrast, do not distinguish 
between nonprofits based on content, rather based on their use of 
professional telemarketers.  The distinction is a matter of jurisdictional 
limitations, not content.  Furthermore, from a policy perspective, if FTC 
rules could be invalidated simply because they result in disparate 
treatment of industries within the Commission’s jurisdiction versus 
industries outside its jurisdiction, a vast array of FTC rules would be 
invalid.  The FTC does not have jurisdiction over, for example, common 
carriers and banks.165  Under the Stenehjem logic, the Commission would 
not be able to issue any regulations unless it could find particular reasons 
why banks and common carriers are less likely to create the same harm 
targeted. 
 
[49]  Were the decisions of Mainstream II and Stenehjem to put the FTC in 
the impossible position of needing to regulate charitable calls but not 
being able to regulate enough of them, the FCC may present the only 
solution.  In crafting its own do-not-call list rules, the FCC similarly 
exempted nonprofit organizations from the national registry, in part 
because the TCPA, from which the FCC received its authority to regulate 
telemarketing, specifically excluded calls from nonprofit organizations 
from the definition of “telephone solicitation.”166  Yet, were Congress to 
amend this definition, the FCC could cover both nonprofits making calls 
directly and those using professional telemarketers.  By contrast, granting 
the FTC jurisdiction over nonprofits directly would contradict the very 
basic definition of “corporation” in the FTC’s enabling statue.167 
 
[50]  Whether Congress would favor such a plan, or any extension of the 
do-not-call registry to charities, is uncertain.  In addition to the clear intent 
 
 
 163 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429. 
 164 Id. at  419. 
 165 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2000).   
 166 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 
1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,147 (Jul. 25, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64, 68); 47 
U.S.C § 227(a)(3) (2000).   
 167 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2000). 
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in the TCPA to exclude charitable calls,168 some members of Congress 
applauded the original rules for not regulating legitimate charities.169 
Senator McConnell, the sponsor of the section of the USA PATRIOT Act 
that extended the FTC’s authority over professional solicitors for 
nonprofits, asserted that “[w]hen Congress enacted this legislation, it did 
not envision, nor did it call for, the FTC to propose a federal ‘do-not-call’ 
list, and certainly not a list that applied to charitable organizations or their 
authorized agents.”170   
 
[51]  However, it is possible that Congress would support the extension if it 
were the only way to save the popular registry.  Caught between the 
“rock” of Mainstream II and the “hard place” of needing to support 
charities, legislators might find more comfort with a bifurcated registry 
that mitigates the harm to charities and gives their constituents more 
choice in what calls they will or will not receive.  If not, they may have to 
fall back on the safely constitutional,171 but less effective, organization-
specific lists, and thus surrender one of the few truly bipartisan triumphs 
of last year. 
 
 
 168 Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144. 
 169 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. H412 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Schakowsky). 
 170 Letter from Mitch McConnell, Senator from Kentucky, to the Federal Trade Commission 
(June 14, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/dnc_mcconnell.pdf. 
 171 See Smolla, supra note 6 (discussing Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 
(1970)). 
